125 NY 214(1891)
Until 1935, breach of promise to marry was a valid cause of action in New York. Under common law, an engagement to marry was a binding contract and breach of a promise to marry could result in damages to the wronged party for economic and emotional harm. Such actions, usually brought by women, were an increasingly common source of litigation and scandal during the Gilded Age.[1] In 1935, the legislature adopted Civil Rights Law Section 80-a and abolished breach of promise to marry and other so-called “heart balm” torts, such as alienation of affections, criminal conversation and seduction, on the grounds that they were encouraging abusive and unjust lawsuits and were contrary to public policy.
Chellis v. Chapman was a classic breach of promise case which presented two significant questions for the Court of Appeals: whether it was proper to allow evidence at trial of the defendant’s general reputation for wealth in the community, and whether the jury could award punitive damages against the defendant. The court, in an opinion by Judge John Gray, answered both questions in the affirmative, with Judges Robert Earl and Rufus Peckham dissenting on the first question.
Sarah Chellis, a 47-year-old teacher and superintendent of schools in the upstate City of Watertown, and John Chapman, a 74-year-old farmer, first met around 1884 or 1885. Chapman “sought her acquaintance, unsolicited by her and with matrimonial views on his part.” Chapman pursued Chellis and twice proposed marriage to her until she agreed and they became engaged in 1886. Chellis left her job to marry Chapman, but on their wedding day Chapman was missing in action.
The wedding day was agreed upon, the usual preparations were made by the plaintiff, and relatives and guests were bidden to the ceremony. But the defendant did not appear. He alleged physical ailments in excuse of not fulfilling his marital engagement; but there was evidence that he was evading it and shamming illness.
Chellis sued Chapman for breach of promise to marry and a jury returned a verdict in her favor for $8,000. The trial judge denied Chapman’s motion for a new trial. The General Term of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department affirmed the judgment.
Writing for the majority, Judge Gray acknowledged that Chapman’s objection to the admission of evidence touching on his reputation for wealth in the community presented an interesting question since it “seems to conflict with the general rule that in actions for a breach of a contract evidence as to the defendant’s wealth is inadmissible.” Normally, the plaintiff in a contract action is “entitled to recover only those damages which he may prove that he has suffered in consequence of the defendant’s failure to perform,” and the “defendant’s solvency, or insolvency, has nothing to do with the issue, and furnishes no measure for the computation of damages.”
But the present action, wrote Judge Gray, “is quite other in its nature, and constitutes an exception to that general rule.”
That the amount of the suitor’s pecuniary means is a factor of some importance in the case of a demand of marriage cannot fairly be denied. It is a circumstance which, very frequently, must have its particular influence upon the mind of the woman, in determining the question of consent or refusal, and, as I think, in a proper case, very naturally and properly so. The ability of the man to support her in comfort and the station in life, which marriage with him holds forth, are matters which may be weighed, in connection with an agreement to marry.
Judge Gray’s opinion sketches a somewhat unflattering portrait of Chapman.
He was possessed of pecuniary means, considerable in amount in the general estimation of his neighbors, and not inconsiderable if we take his own estimate. Though pretending to some cultivation of mind, which, among other ways, if we may judge from this record, he seemed to delight in displaying by a versification of the homely, though not very inspiring or romantic, topics and events of his farm life and surrroundings, he yet was, seemingly, lacking in those outward graces of the person, which are not infrequently deemed a substitute for more solid possessions. Nor does he seem to have had recourse to the adventitious aids of the wardrobe, to adorn his exterior person and thereby to compensate for personal shortcomings.
In Judge Gray’s view, it was proper for the jury to be made aware of the defendant’s personal shortcomings and economic advantages in order to understand the plaintiff’s state of mind when she agreed to change her position in life and give up her independence through marriage.
Of these circumstances, the home offered, which, for its comforts and ease, would depend upon the more or less ample pecuniary means of the defendant; the freedom from the personal exertions for daily support; the social position accompanying the marriage–all these are facts which have their proper bearing upon the question of marriage.
* * * *
[E]vidence of the reputation of the defendant as to wealth is admissible in these cases. The belief of the plaintiff must have been influenced by the opinions, or beliefs, of the members of the community in which the defendant resided. She could not be presumed to have personal cognizance of a matter, which is so peculiarly one within the individual’s exclusive knowledge, and what credence she gave to general report was not without justification. She had some right to rely upon it.
The court also held that the jury had discretion to award punitive damages based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Upon reviewing the nature of Chapman’s actions tending to embarrass Chellis, the Court concluded that “there was sufficient evidence in the case upon which a verdict might well include exemplary damages.”
If the conduct of the defendant in violating his promise is characterized by a disregard of the plaintiff’s feelings, or reputation; if he has placed her, or induced her to place herself, in a false position, or to forego temporal advantages; if the breach of his promise is unjustifiable; if he spreads upon the record matters in defense of the action which are scandalous and tend to reflect discredit upon the plaintiff, or stain her reputation, then these are all circumstances, which may be considered by the jury and may be availed of by them to enhance the damages.
Sources
Bergan, The History of the New York Court of Appeals, 1847-1932, Columbia Univ. Press (1985), at 174-76.
[1] Tori Telfer, “How the ‘Heart Balm Racket’ Convinced America That Women Were Up to No Good,” Smithsonian Magazine, Feb. 13, 2018.